Existing engineering problems in Mosul Dam and their background are discussed in this paper. A thorough review of the available geological reports was made. These reports covered many decades of investigations from 1953 up to the investigations performed during the construction of the dam. A large volume of geological information was accumulated during these investigations, but it is unfortunate to see that some of the basic facts were not interpreted correctly. This applies to the incorrect correlation of the encountered beds in the exploration boreholes and miss-understanding of the actual stratigraphic succession at the dam site. This misinterpretation contributed to misleading results regarding the true karst zones and the type of rocks and their thicknesses in the foundation zone and surrounding area. As a result, the dam was placed on problematic foundations consisting of brecciated and highly kartsified gypsum/anhydrite rocks and/or conglomerates in which gypsum forms the main constituent as cementing materials. Karstified beds were not recognized in some depths and were described as normal marl and/or breccias. This also added to the use of improper method of foundation treatment by adopting a deep grout curtain as the main anti-seepage measure instead of using a more positive measure by constructing a diaphragm wall. The mentioned misinterpretations are discussed here in details together with their consequences, and a more accurate picture of the geology is presented.
1981-1986 on the Tigris River about 60 Km NW of Mosul City, Iraq ( Figure 1 ).
It is a multipurpose earth fill dam for irrigation, flood control, water supply, and hydropower. It is 3.4 km long, 113 m high with crest width of 12 meters and a base width of about 600 meters at the river section. Its storage capacity is 11.11 km 3 , and the dam is built on highly karstified gypsum and limestone beds [1] .
The project was planned since 1952 by the Iraqi Development Board. The location of the dam was changed many times upstream and downstream from its present location depending on the submitted reports by the various consultants to the Ministry of Irrigation (Water Resources). Although the geological conditions in the present dam site and for few tens of kilometres up-stream and/or down-stream are the same, the geological conditions were not the essential parameters in the site selection. The deciding factors were to get maximum storage of water and to have control of the irrigation projects planned at the north of Iraq. The exposed rocks at the dam site belong to the Fatha (ex-Lower Fars)
Formation and it consists of cyclic deposited sediments. Each cycle consists of green marl, limestone and gypsum [2] .
Many reports were written on the problems in the foundations of Mosul Dam by different authors and agencies. Al-Ansari et al. [3] published a book, which can be considered as the most comprehensive to cover the whole aspect. Another significant geological report is that presented by [4] .
The main aims of this study are to shed light on the ambiguous geological conditions, which were miss-interpreted and to describe the consequences of this interpretation, which include the continuous grouting that has been carried In order to fulfil the aims of this study, tens of reports on Mosul Dam were reviewed with special emphasis on those dealing with the geological investigations and foundations treatments. Moreover, many other reports and maps concerning regional geology and detailed studies, which were carried out by the Iraq Geological Survey were also consulted.
Geological Setting
In the following, a brief description of the dam site geology is presented. The 
Stratigraphy
The exposed rocks in the dam site and near surroundings belong to the Miocene Period within the following formations ( e) Quaternary Sediments: These include river terraces and flood plain sediments, the former occur in different levels. The pebbles are cemented by gypsiferous and sandy materials, whereas the other includes high percentage of gypsiferous material within the silt, clay and fine sand.
The geology of the dam site is also characterized by the presence of four dis-
tinct layers of brecciated gypsum within the Fatha formation. These layers have thicknesses which range of 8 -18 m and they are designated in the Swiss Consultants Consortium reports [13] [14] [15] [16] as the GB-layers. The GB0 is at a depth of 80 m from the ground surface in the river section, while GB3 was uncovered in the excavation of foundations of the ski jump structure at the end of the spillway chute.
The importance of these gypsum layers stems from their resistance to take grout materials during the construction of the deep grout curtain under the dam.
In addition, they could not keep the grout material when subjected to the rising hydrostatic pressure due to the impounding of the reservoir. The correct behaviour of these GB layers was not fully grasped in spite of the long discussions on this subject, which had taken place during the many meetings with the Mosul Dam International Board of Experts (IBOE), which was assigned by the owner to oversee the design and construction of the dam [17] - [25] and Mosul Dam IBOE report to the minister of Irrigation 1984 [26] . These meetings had taken place during the construction of the dam and extended even through the maintenance period. The failing to find proper solutions for the continuous seepage seemed to originate from the miss-interpretation of the basic geological facts, and missjudgement of gypsum rock behaviour in this environment and its dissolution phenomenon, in addition to the peculiar nature of the brecciated gypsum in not accepting grouting materials. This has led to the current maintenance work on the grout curtain which continued from 1985 until today.
The red clay stone beds were described by the Swiss Consultants Consortium below the so-called Jeribe Formation and were called "Bauxite" [14] . Their thickness range is 1 -25 meters and they are most probably "Terra Rossa". This
Indicates the erosion phase between the Lower Miocene (Euphrates Formation) and Middle Miocene (Fatha Formation). Such claystone beds include high percentage of kaolinite; a clay mineral with extremely high ability of expansion after being saturated [27] and they are good indication for the presence of karsts caves.
Tectonics and Structural Geology
Mosul Dam site and the near surroundings are located within the Low Folded Zone of the Outer Platform, which belongs to the Arabian Plate. The whole area belongs to the Zagros Fold -Thrust Belt [28] . The Low Folded Zone is characterized by long and narrow anticlines separated by shallow and wide synclines. 
Results
The recognized ambiguities in the geological conditions; as far as the dam safety is concerned, are discussed in the following:
The dam site was chosen for reasons other than geologic merits as it offered very large volume of storage and the location served the irrigation purposes of supplying water to the Jazera irrigation project nearby. From a geologic standpoint, the foundation is very poor, and the site geology is the principal cause of continuing intense concern about the safety of the structure. Specifically, the dam was constructed on alternating and highly variable units of gypsum, anhydrite, marl, and limestone, each of which, apart from the marl is soluble in water under all conditions [1] . The presence of the brecciated gypsum layers designated in the Mosul Dam literature as GB layers, adds to the complexity of the already complicated geological situation. After thorough and careful reviewing of the existing geological reports and those, which deal with the foundation's treatments, the following miss-understandings of the geological conditions by the designers of the dam and also by the site supervisory staff may be observed.
These misunderstandings have caused problems to the dam as a whole and to its foundations in particular.
Stratigraphic Succession
According to the authors the true stratigraphic succession is the one given in this study, which is different from what is mentioned by the [4] [13] . The age of the formations is not an important aspect in the geotechnical applications; however, the true stratigraphic succession should be known to be able to predict the type of rocks in the subsurface sections.
The correct stratigraphic rock column (see Figure 3) is one of the main issues and it was not defined correctly during the interpretation of the geological data, 
Units
• Use
This may be explained by that the Jeribe Formation was in fact no more than Unit A1 of the Fatha Formation as explained above. The red clay stone beds described by the Swiss Consultants Consortium below the so-called Jeribe Formation which were called "Bauxite" [13] and which had a thickness of 
Karst Zone and/or Line
The . After [34] . Note that the karst lines cross the Lithological bed.
was formed by a joint venture from the Swiss Consultants Consortium and Energoprojekt of Belgrade to conduct daily supervision of the works. As it is presented, the karst line doesn't follow certain bed or the regional dip, which is not possible from a geological point of view. Normally the karstification is related to certain bed(s) and therefore, it should follow the regional dip and not cross it (Figure 4) . Moreover, the karst line as shown rises upwards against the dip, which means the karstification, is not related to a certain bed and/ or depth.
The plotted karst line was used in the design as an indication of the lower boundary of all Gypsum and other karstified beds. It was considered to define the required depth of the deep grout curtain under the dam; the curtain was even taken 20 meters below these karsts as a precautionary measure [35] . But, the continued dissolution in the foundation below this depth during the maintenance grouting showed that the actual karst line is much deeper than the defined one. This supports the opinion set out previously, that the interpretation of the foundation stratigraphy by the dam geologists was not the correct and they did not correlate with recognized stratigraphy of other similar locations in Iraq like the wax plant which is 20 km away.
Some Remarks on the Foundations Treatment
The construction procedures described in the [16] shows that the foundation surface preparations for placing the fill materials of the dam were not adequate or not correct in some places when compared to common international experience. One example of this is how the clay core was placed directly on the gypsum beds in the cut-off trench in the left side of the river section. Here it was not possible to remove the gypsum beds due to their thickness. It was assumed that the anti-seepage measures (Blanket Grouting and the grout curtain) were able to stop the seepage flow at the (core-foundation) interface completely. Such an assumption cannot be guaranteed since any grouting works can never achieve a value of 100% efficiency. In a research work by [36] it is stated that even a permeability as low as 10 -8 ms −1 under 20 m water head can allow leakage of 20 000 m 3 per day. In the same reference, the following conclusion was reached:
"Seepage through the foundations and abutments of dams containing soluble rock may produce settlement and redistribution of pore pressures which could threaten stability". This Seepage will undoubtedly lead to dissolution of gypsum and corresponding settlement of the core in the long time perspective. This is true also for all the gypsum beds present in the Fatha formation, even those at large depths.
In the preparation of foundations of the upstream and downstream shells of the dam at the left side of the river channel, excavation of unsuitable materials was restricted to fluvial top soil, sand and silt of the flood plain sediment and so the shells were placed on the conglomerates of the river terraces [16] . The cementing materials of these conglomerates were soluble secondary gypsum, which on dissolving by water may result in very porous mass that can settle considerably due to the weight of the shells and may cause them to crack severely. In a paper by [37] , conglomerates cemented by gypsum in foundation of hydraulic structures are described as "particularly hazardous".
In preparing the foundation of some of the concrete structures, the procedure used was to remove all doubtful materials and replace them by rollcrete. No objection can be raised against the removal, but in some places this was not followed consistently. An example can be seen in the foundation preparation of the earth-fill part of the emergency spillway (fuse plug) in front of the concrete weir.
Here, the left half of the core was located on the existing marly impermeable layer but the right half was located on conglomerates. The surface of the conglomerates was only cleaned and a horizontal clay blanket was placed on top of it in front of the clay core to cover its surface and, some drainage arrangement was 
Laboratory Test and Analyses
From the review of the available data of the laboratory tests and analyses, it is clear that the used materials in constructing the various parts of the dam were subjected to geotechnical tests only [16] . No data regarding the chemical properties of the construction materials were found in order to support the suitability of the material to be used in the dam body. This is especially important for the river terrace conglomerates, which were processed and used for the construction of the upstream and downstream shells of the dam and also for the filters. It is already explained that these conglomerates contain secondary gypsum as cementing material and the presence of such gypsum in the filling materials is not considered as a safe practice. Processing of these materials for the gravel filters was performed by crushing and sorting out the various fractions according to the recommended zones stipulated in the technical specifications. No washing was considered in the process, which means that there existed the possibility of contamination of this filter with gypsum exists. If such material contaminated with gypsum is used as filter, then such use would be detrimental to the safety of the dam.
Experience of the Consultants and Contractors
The companies forming the design consortium were considered as the best con-sultants for dams worldwide at the time of Mosul Dam construction as were the companies forming the contractor's joint venture (GIMOD). Nevertheless they were not highly experienced in karstification problems induced by the dissolution of gypsum beds and their consequences. Moreover, they did not anticipate the peculiar behaviour of the gypsum breccias layers, which do not accept permanently all tried types of grouting materials [38] .
From the IBOE reports collection it got obvious that the field geologists did not have good and clear picture of the geological conditions prevailing at the site during the investigations and design phase. One of the major gaps was the lack of knowledge on the extend of karsts in depth and the ground water movement regime contributing to its development before construction. Therefore they 
Discussion
Gypsum induced hazards are well known in Iraq, especially in areas where the Fatha Formation (ex-Lower Fars) is exposed. Documenting this was done over the previous decades in studies, which were written by many researchers; among them are: [7] [40] [41] [42] [43] . All these studies and many more deal with the induced problems to engineering structures constructed in areas built on gypsum rocks.
Gypsum beds are highly karstified not only in Mosul Dam site area, but in the whole surroundings. Good example is the wax plant site, which is located 25 kilometres south of Mosul dam. There, the gypsum beds are highly karstified and characterized by large caverns filled by clay and marl ( Figure 5 and Figure 6 ).
The dissolved gypsum beds had left large cavities filled with weathered clayey and marly materials as well as some limestone and gypsum fragments ( Figure   7 ). Therefore, when a borehole is drilled in such location gypsum may be missed. The site geologist, especially when he is not familiar with such cases will most probably consider the next encountered gypsum bed in the borehole as the first one; and consequently will miss the true serial number of the gypsum beds.
The misleading configuration of the karsts line projected at the Mosul dam It may be said with certainty that this misinterpretation is one of the main reasons for the failure of the grouting programs over the years in different locations and the inability of this curtain to achieve its intended function in spite of the different procedures and different grouting mixes and materials used. Adding to this, the understanding of the gypsum karsts and the gypsum breccias beds behaviour was limited. This explains the failed attempts to achieve the specified design criteria in the deep grout curtain and such design criteria which were fixed by the designers themselves. This is well documented in the study of [4] .
The recognized red claystone, which was so called "Bauxite" by [13] is actually of 'Terra Rossa"; sediments which indicate karst depression [27] . It is very strange that this was not considered when defining the karst on the geological cross section (Figure 4 In reviewing the many reports, such as [4] it is seen that the only solution, which has been considered to top the seepage and in consequence to stop dissolution of the gypsum was the construction of the grouting curtain. In those reports and studies it has not been recognized that such curtain needs to show a 100% efficiency to achieve this. The curtain was designed (depth and extension wise) based on the drawn karst line shown in the cross sections of (Figure 4) . 2) The coordinates of the boreholes should be recorded very precisely.
3) The boreholes should be drilled with well experienced drillers being well experienced in drilling through karstified rocks.
4) The core recovery should be not less than 85% to assure the drilled core will represent the true status of the penetrated sections.
5) The description of the extracted cores should be performed with well experienced geologist being well acquainted in description of karstified rocks 6) Full colored photography should be applied to the extracted core.
7) The lowermost part of the cores, when are free of gypsum beds, should be studied by well experienced paleontologist to decide whether the penetrated rocks are within the Fatha (ex-Lower Fars), the Euphrates Formation or Oligocene rocks. To assure the depth of the karstified rocks.
8) Storing of the core in relevant core boxes providing that the boxes will be numbered properly and kept in safe stores; assuring their usage in future; if needed.
9) Performing many geophysical traverses by well experienced geophysicists using macro gravimeter and ground penetration radar methods in the locations of the drilled boreholes and near surroundings.
10) The acquired geophysical data should be corrected using the drilling data, and vice versa.
11) According to the acquired data, the constructed karst lines, which are super imposed over the constructed geological cross sections should be corrected by a well experienced structural geologist and/ or field geologist.
12) Accordingly, all previously designed grouting programs and construction of the grout curtain should be redesigned.
Conclusions
The main general conclusions and recommendations that may be derived from the above are the followings:
1) It is very clear that there was a lack of misunderstanding and misinterpreta- 4) The geological investigations showed the presence not only of gypsum beds but indicated also the presence of four brecciated gypsum layers at various depths within the range of the grouted zone. The Consultants and the foundation treatment Sub-contractors could not understand the nature and structure of these layers even by examining the cores of these layers. These layers proved to be most resistant to all types of grout mixes and materials and procedures. When such layers were grouted, this was only temporary and soon they were eroded leaving gaps in the curtain. This is the reason that the grouting has been repeated time and again over the years and the dissolution process continuing with no hope of stopping. It is very unfortunate that had the Consultants understood the geological problems correctly at the beginning and, had they known more about gypsum and brecciated gypsum behaviour, they would have used a positive cutoff diaphragm rather than using this doubtful grout curtain. Constructing such diaphragm could have been done at that time with the available technologies at much more saving and with much better results. shown previously in this paper. It is therefore, strongly recommended to have much more drilling at this site and to go much deeper in depth than what was previously done. One important aspect of the design should be the use of diaphragm wall and not to put faith on any grout curtain here.
